http://slate.msn.com/id/2078672/
Fortune 500, Meet Daytona 500
Slate ^ | 17 feb 03 | Charles Duhigg
When Michael Waltrip feinted briefly, sped in close behind another
car, and then whipped past Jimmie Johnson to win the rain-shortened
Daytona 500 on Sunday, the crowds surrounding the track, screaming
through mouthfuls of $7 chili dogs and a sea of Confederate flags,
cheered with wild glee. The Excitement! The Noise! The Complexity
Theory!
So an economics professor goes to the Daytona 500 � It sounds like the
beginning of a bad joke. But for game theorists, stock car racing is
emerging as an unlikely laboratory for understanding the world. A 2002
Rand Corp. paper titled "Social Science at 190 MPH on NASCAR's Biggest
Superspeedways" suggests that NASCAR should interest academics because
it offers an opportunity to study a complexity rarely seen in other
sports but much evident in the real world: the tension between
cooperation and competition that is necessary for modern victory.
The NASCAR laboratory is a product of simple physics. Unlike other
sports, which are largely determined by individual athletic ability or
team strength, NASCAR requires its competitors to cooperate in order
to win. The forced cooperation is a product of two factors. First,
NASCAR imposes engineering restrictions that prevent any driver from
attaining a major equipment advantage over rivals. And second,
"drafting" allows cooperating cars to go faster. In the 1960s, drivers
discovered that if one stock car closely follows another, drafting in
its wake, both cars increase speed. The lead car benefits from a drop
in air resistance that comes when the slight vacuum at its rear wheels
is filled. And the second car speeds up because it's partially
protected from the wind. The more cars that are lined up, the faster
each car goes. Hence the monotonous rows that develop around the oval
track at Daytona.
Drafting raises all sorts of delightful game theory possibilities. As
long as two racers stay in a partnership, they can catch up with or
pass other cars that are not drafting. Partnering doesn't bring home
the trophy, though. To win, a racer must defect and pass his
opponents, but as David Ronfeldt, the author of the Rand paper
explains, when "a racer in a line wants to break out and get ahead he
needs at least one partner. If he swings out alone, he is bound to
lose momentum" and lose the race, leading to the NASCAR axiom that "it
takes two to pass one." So, cars engage in a delicate dance of game
theory and false allegiances, forming partnerships at 190 mph to
overtake the leader until a betrayal or defection leaves one car
falling back while the other partners with a new rival.
The gamesmanship gets even more complicated. When two cars begin
drafting, the second driver gains an advantage if he (and all NASCAR
drivers are "he") drops back a length or two and then re-enters the
draft zone and uses the tiny extra momentum to slingshot past the
leader. Additionally, following cars can "fan the tail" of the leader,
moving their bumper within inches of the lead car and fanning back and
forth to disrupt the airflow over the vehicle. As the aerodynamics
scatter, the lead car loses downward grip and the driver must slacken
acceleration to avoid sliding sideways. So lead drivers will slow when
they see followers begin to fall back or "mirror" the drivers behind
them to prevent attacks.
This tension between cooperation and competition is precisely where
Ronfeldt sees applicability to the real world, because it turns out
that similar dynamics exist all around us. When Microsoft and Cisco
developed partnerships during the '90s with potential competitors such
as Intel, Compaq, and Dell, they formed "drafting lines" that
weathered the booms and busts that damaged lone drivers like Apple.
Sen. Trent Lott's fall from grace and Sen. Bill Frist's ascendance can
be explained in part by a series of defections of potential rivals
from Lott to Frist that, once started, built a momentum that became
impossible for Lott to slow. At the core of these events is a tenet of
the emerging science of complexity: Cooperation can sustain a
surprisingly high degree of competition, as long as the participants
agree to some basic rules.
But why do some partnerships work while others end in disarray? Again,
NASCAR teaches lessons. Frist and Microsoft attract drafting partners
for the same reason that Dale "The Intimidator" Earnhardt won races:
They have enough "social capital" to convince competitors they will
honor their partnership contracts, even if just for a while. In
NASCAR, some of this social capital is achieved through agreements
struck prior to a race or by radio communication during competition.
(NASCAR's utility as a laboratory is enhanced by our ability to
retroactively review communications and compare them to tapes of the
race.) But more frequently it is a product of the NASCAR ethic of Hard
but Fair. "I'll race clean because I know the rules," one driver
explained. "But if you get too greedy, it's payback time." Put another
way, even though we may be rivals in the future, we'll agree to trust
each other right now.
NASCAR also serves as an interesting model for what causes certain
kinds of aggressive behavior. Economists at the University of Chicago
made a surprising discovery when they began examining NASCAR
accidents. While they initially assumed that aggressive driving and
the attendant crashes occur when racers are eager to pass cars in
front of them, it turns out the opposite is true. Drivers are more
likely to crash when someone is about to overtake them. In other
words, racers become more aggressive not when they think they can win,
but when they're afraid they're going to lose.
And so does everyone else. Research suggests that investment bankers
are more prone to commit fraud when they feel the competitor at their
heels. Students in school cheat not to get the "A," but to avoid the
"C." From Indonesian cockfighting to technological change,
recklessness stems more from the fear of falling than the excitement
of new heights. "Don't be greedy" is how Cisco's CEO explains his
strategy for transforming competitors into docile partners. The
cooperation of NASCAR, or any other system it turns out, persists only
when everyone believes he has the opportunity to win.
These implications may be significant. America stands at an
interesting crossroads: The drafting lines that developed in the wake
of the Gulf War have fractured. Our social capital in the global
arena, which carried us through much of the last decade, may be on the
wane. Last year, when President Bush invited Tony Stewart, the 2002
NASCAR Winston Cup champion, to the White House, some cynics suggested
he was pandering for Southern votes. But maybe the president was just
looking for a few tips.
=====================================================================
Question: Why are there so many trees along the Champs Elysee?
Answer: So the Nazis could march in the shade.
=====================================================================
The original's a good read too:
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_2/ronfeldt/index.html
"rrevved" <[email hidden]> wrote in message
news:[email hidden]...
Quoted text (133 lines)
> > http://slate.msn.com/id/2078672/ > > Fortune 500, Meet Daytona 500 > Slate ^ | 17 feb 03 | Charles Duhigg > > > When Michael Waltrip feinted briefly, sped in close behind another > car, and then whipped past Jimmie Johnson to win the rain-shortened > Daytona 500 on Sunday, the crowds surrounding the track, screaming > through mouthfuls of $7 chili dogs and a sea of Confederate flags, > cheered with wild glee. The Excitement! The Noise! The Complexity > Theory! > > So an economics professor goes to the Daytona 500 . It sounds like the > beginning of a bad joke. But for game theorists, stock car racing is > emerging as an unlikely laboratory for understanding the world. A 2002 > Rand Corp. paper titled "Social Science at 190 MPH on NASCAR's Biggest > Superspeedways" suggests that NASCAR should interest academics because > it offers an opportunity to study a complexity rarely seen in other > sports but much evident in the real world: the tension between > cooperation and competition that is necessary for modern victory. > > > The NASCAR laboratory is a product of simple physics. Unlike other > sports, which are largely determined by individual athletic ability or > team strength, NASCAR requires its competitors to cooperate in order > to win. The forced cooperation is a product of two factors. First, > NASCAR imposes engineering restrictions that prevent any driver from > attaining a major equipment advantage over rivals. And second, > "drafting" allows cooperating cars to go faster. In the 1960s, drivers > discovered that if one stock car closely follows another, drafting in > its wake, both cars increase speed. The lead car benefits from a drop > in air resistance that comes when the slight vacuum at its rear wheels > is filled. And the second car speeds up because it's partially > protected from the wind. The more cars that are lined up, the faster > each car goes. Hence the monotonous rows that develop around the oval > track at Daytona. > > Drafting raises all sorts of delightful game theory possibilities. As > long as two racers stay in a partnership, they can catch up with or > pass other cars that are not drafting. Partnering doesn't bring home > the trophy, though. To win, a racer must defect and pass his > opponents, but as David Ronfeldt, the author of the Rand paper > explains, when "a racer in a line wants to break out and get ahead he > needs at least one partner. If he swings out alone, he is bound to > lose momentum" and lose the race, leading to the NASCAR axiom that "it > takes two to pass one." So, cars engage in a delicate dance of game > theory and false allegiances, forming partnerships at 190 mph to > overtake the leader until a betrayal or defection leaves one car > falling back while the other partners with a new rival. > > The gamesmanship gets even more complicated. When two cars begin > drafting, the second driver gains an advantage if he (and all NASCAR > drivers are "he") drops back a length or two and then re-enters the > draft zone and uses the tiny extra momentum to slingshot past the > leader. Additionally, following cars can "fan the tail" of the leader, > moving their bumper within inches of the lead car and fanning back and > forth to disrupt the airflow over the vehicle. As the aerodynamics > scatter, the lead car loses downward grip and the driver must slacken > acceleration to avoid sliding sideways. So lead drivers will slow when > they see followers begin to fall back or "mirror" the drivers behind > them to prevent attacks. > > This tension between cooperation and competition is precisely where > Ronfeldt sees applicability to the real world, because it turns out > that similar dynamics exist all around us. When Microsoft and Cisco > developed partnerships during the '90s with potential competitors such > as Intel, Compaq, and Dell, they formed "drafting lines" that > weathered the booms and busts that damaged lone drivers like Apple. > Sen. Trent Lott's fall from grace and Sen. Bill Frist's ascendance can > be explained in part by a series of defections of potential rivals > from Lott to Frist that, once started, built a momentum that became > impossible for Lott to slow. At the core of these events is a tenet of > the emerging science of complexity: Cooperation can sustain a > surprisingly high degree of competition, as long as the participants > agree to some basic rules. > > But why do some partnerships work while others end in disarray? Again, > NASCAR teaches lessons. Frist and Microsoft attract drafting partners > for the same reason that Dale "The Intimidator" Earnhardt won races: > They have enough "social capital" to convince competitors they will > honor their partnership contracts, even if just for a while. In > NASCAR, some of this social capital is achieved through agreements > struck prior to a race or by radio communication during competition. > (NASCAR's utility as a laboratory is enhanced by our ability to > retroactively review communications and compare them to tapes of the > race.) But more frequently it is a product of the NASCAR ethic of Hard > but Fair. "I'll race clean because I know the rules," one driver > explained. "But if you get too greedy, it's payback time." Put another > way, even though we may be rivals in the future, we'll agree to trust > each other right now. > > NASCAR also serves as an interesting model for what causes certain > kinds of aggressive behavior. Economists at the University of Chicago > made a surprising discovery when they began examining NASCAR > accidents. While they initially assumed that aggressive driving and > the attendant crashes occur when racers are eager to pass cars in > front of them, it turns out the opposite is true. Drivers are more > likely to crash when someone is about to overtake them. In other > words, racers become more aggressive not when they think they can win, > but when they're afraid they're going to lose. > > And so does everyone else. Research suggests that investment bankers > are more prone to commit fraud when they feel the competitor at their > heels. Students in school cheat not to get the "A," but to avoid the > "C." From Indonesian cockfighting to technological change, > recklessness stems more from the fear of falling than the excitement > of new heights. "Don't be greedy" is how Cisco's CEO explains his > strategy for transforming competitors into docile partners. The > cooperation of NASCAR, or any other system it turns out, persists only > when everyone believes he has the opportunity to win. > > These implications may be significant. America stands at an > interesting crossroads: The drafting lines that developed in the wake > of the Gulf War have fractured. Our social capital in the global > arena, which carried us through much of the last decade, may be on the > wane. Last year, when President Bush invited Tony Stewart, the 2002 > NASCAR Winston Cup champion, to the White House, some cynics suggested > he was pandering for Southern votes. But maybe the president was just > looking for a few tips. > > > > ===================================================================== > > Question: Why are there so many trees along the Champs Elysee? > > Answer: So the Nazis could march in the shade. > > ===================================================================== > >The original's a good read too:
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_2/ronfeldt/index.html
"rrevved" <[email hidden]> wrote in message
news:[email hidden]...
I stopped reading right there.
Quoted text (11 lines)
> > http://slate.msn.com/id/2078672/ > > Fortune 500, Meet Daytona 500 > Slate ^ | 17 feb 03 | Charles Duhigg > > > When Michael Waltrip feinted briefly, sped in close behind another > car, and then whipped past Jimmie Johnson to win the rain-shortened > Daytona 500 on Sunday, the crowds surrounding the track, screaming > through mouthfuls of $7 chili dogs and a sea of Confederate flagsLOL, when you start comparing real life to a weekend at a Nascar race, it's
time to hang 'em up ...
"rrevved" <[email hidden]> wrote in message
news:[email hidden]...
rrevved wrote:
>
<snip total bullshit>
I wonder how you analyze an accident when you do not have the first clue
what you are talking about?
When did Intel ever compete with Microsoft? Did I miss that part? Isn't
one of them a hardware mfg. and the other a software company?
Do academics actually draw a paycheck for writing total drivel? If you
want to get into that line of work learn to use the word "ballet" as
many ways as you can.
When baseball was the meaning of American life a 6,4,3 double play was
likened to a ballet. Then the NFL got to be more popular and it was a
ballet of some sort. In the Jordan/Johnson/Barkley/Bird era the NBA was
pretty popular so guess what...ballet?! And now that you can hardly go
take a piss without walking around life-sized cardboard WC drivers it
appears that auto racing is a ballet also. If you meet or exceed your
ballet quota you can try dance,waltz,jitterbug,rhumba,or my all time
favorite choreography.
The fact that there are no standards for comparing a spectator sport to
dance forms and no penalty for having your analysis being completely
wrong makes it a good gig.
Since the academic game theorists have that all figured out so neatly
you would think that the next step would be to buy two cars and hire two
drivers and win every race from here on out.
In article <ioh4a.23962$[email hidden]>, "Kyle Roberts"
<[email hidden]> writes:
Why? Was that inaccurate? And if so, how?
Eldred
--
Homepage - http://www.umich.edu/~epickett
GPLRank:-0.381
MonsterRank: +339.873
N2002 Rank:+17.59
Never argue with an idiot. He brings you down to his level, then beats you
with experience...
Remove SPAM-OFF to reply.
Quoted text (10 lines)
> >> When Michael Waltrip feinted briefly, sped in close behind another >> car, and then whipped past Jimmie Johnson to win the rain-shortened >> Daytona 500 on Sunday, the crowds surrounding the track, screaming >> through mouthfuls of $7 chili dogs and a sea of Confederate flags > > >I stopped reading right there. > >cfswestern wrote:
> rrevved wrote:
> Since the academic game theorists have that all figured out so neatly
> you would think that the next step would be to buy two cars and hire two
> drivers and win every race from here on out.
>
They do that in Europe ;),
but the budget is over 300 million dollars...
"rrevved" <[email hidden]> wrote in message
news:[email hidden]...
I think the business theory needs work but it's given me a slightly better
appreciation of NASCAR, so in that respect it's well written.
Malc.
Quoted text (7 lines)
> > http://slate.msn.com/id/2078672/ > > Fortune 500, Meet Daytona 500 > Slate ^ | 17 feb 03 | Charles Duhigg > > So an economics professor goes to the Daytona 500 .
"cfswestern" <[email hidden]> wrote in message
news:[email hidden]...
> rrevved wrote:
> >
>
> <snip total bullshit>
<snip counter bullshit stuff >
>
> Since the academic game theorists have that all figured out so neatly
> you would think that the next step would be to buy two cars and hire two
> drivers and win every race from here on out.
>
. . . but isn't that, more or less, what DEI has gone and done ?
;o)
Elrikk
John Hilsman <[email hidden]> wrote in
news:[email hidden]:
here here! our family reunion is every year in the darlington infield
for the southern 500. yep there are dixie flags galore and a lot of fun
and yes the folk are just as nice as anywhere else i've been, including
the north, midwest and even texas.
of course my redneck family members get upset when i ask them what the
dixie flag means to them and why they have to scream when yet another air
horn bellows the first notes of "Dixie." I've been told they were going
to send me back north to arkansas where people think like i do, lol.
i tell you when it was scary...... back in the early 70's there were
roaming gangs of thuggie redneck kids that you tried not to get caught
by. they ruled the playground......
oh well, shine it on......
rob
Quoted text (19 lines)
> Articles that start like that are usually full of hyperbole, playing > on one of the few stereotypes that is still politically correct - > America's favorite local whipping boy, the Southern white male. > > Reminds me of the article I read last week on the same site > (http://slate.msn.com/id/2078562/ if anyone cares) about the wimp who > said he was AFRAID to go to the Daytona 500. I've been to Daytona, > Darlington, Atlanta, Talladega, and Bristol and while there are > certainly a few flags and more than a few hillbillies at some of > those, I've never seen anything that could at all be called 'a sea'. > Announcers chuckle over football fans when they wear as much paint as > clothes to a game, but enthusiastic race fans give some people > "Deliverance" flashbacks. Not saying you won't see some of those > people, but it's really no worse than any other live sporting event > and probably a nicer crowd, actually. At least, I've never heard of > people throwing batteries and stuff at the drivers.. Most will even > give you a beer if you don't have one handy :) > >Totally unrelated except for certain aspects of gaming and probability, but
in Germany yesterday something like *thirty* people picked the winning 6
numbers. Think about the odds. Each received only about 43,000. Dohhh!
They were $10 chili dogs and $8 "souvenir beer"....
--
>
> Why? Was that inaccurate? And if so, how?
>
> Eldred
> --
> Homepage - http://www.umich.edu/~epickett
> GPLRank:-0.381
> MonsterRank: +339.873
> N2002 Rank:+17.59
>
> Never argue with an idiot. He brings you down to his level, then beats
you
> with experience...
> Remove SPAM-OFF to reply.
Quoted text (13 lines)
>Reminds me of the article I read last week on the same site >(http://slate.msn.com/id/2078562/ if anyone cares) about the wimp who >said he was AFRAID to go to the Daytona 500. I've been to Daytona, >Darlington, Atlanta, Talladega, and Bristol and while there are >certainly a few flags and more than a few hillbillies at some of >those, I've never seen anything that could at all be called 'a sea'. >Announcers chuckle over football fans when they wear as much paint as >clothes to a game, but enthusiastic race fans give some people >"Deliverance" flashbacks. Not saying you won't see some of those >people, but it's really no worse than any other live sporting event >and probably a nicer crowd, actually. At least, I've never heard of >people throwing batteries and stuff at the drivers.. Most will even >give you a beer if you don't have one handy :)
"EldredP" <[email hidden]> wrote in message
news:[email hidden]...
I was there Sunday and I didn't see a single Confederate Flag. I am sure
there were some in the infield, but not a sea by any means. That was enough
stereotypical BS for me to stop reading.
Kyle
Quoted text (15 lines)
> In article <ioh4a.23962$[email hidden]>, "Kyle Roberts" > <[email hidden]> writes: > > > > >> When Michael Waltrip feinted briefly, sped in close behind another > >> car, and then whipped past Jimmie Johnson to win the rain-shortened > >> Daytona 500 on Sunday, the crowds surrounding the track, screaming > >> through mouthfuls of $7 chili dogs and a sea of Confederate flags > > > > > >I stopped reading right there. > > > > > > Why? Was that inaccurate? And if so, how?"Kyle Roberts" <[email hidden]> wrote in message
news:%7z4a.35852$[email hidden]...
enough
> stereotypical BS for me to stop reading.
>
> Kyle
Don't blame you for bailing on that one, but if you haven't, have a look at
the original Ronfeldt article referenced. No attitude, and some interesting
insights into what makes Nascar so much different from other forms of racing
(except bicycles ;-)). Again, it's:
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_2/ronfeldt/index.html
SB
Quoted text (21 lines)
> > "EldredP" <[email hidden]> wrote in message > news:[email hidden]... > > In article <ioh4a.23962$[email hidden]>, "Kyle Roberts" > > <[email hidden]> writes: > > > > > > > >> When Michael Waltrip feinted briefly, sped in close behind another > > >> car, and then whipped past Jimmie Johnson to win the rain-shortened > > >> Daytona 500 on Sunday, the crowds surrounding the track, screaming > > >> through mouthfuls of $7 chili dogs and a sea of Confederate flags > > > > > > > > >I stopped reading right there. > > > > > > > > > > Why? Was that inaccurate? And if so, how? > > I was there Sunday and I didn't see a single Confederate Flag. I am sure > there were some in the infield, but not a sea by any means. That was
great article, thanks.
On Mon, 17 Feb 2003 17:51:22 -0600, rrevved <[email hidden]> wrote:
