It's now quite clear how the results of the surge will be dealt with by
domestic opponents of the Iraq war.
They're going to be ignored.
They're being ignored now. Virtually no media source or Democratic
politician (and not a few Republicans, led by Richard "I can always
backtrack" Lugar) is willing to admit that the situation on the ground has
changed dramatically over the past three months. Coalition efforts have
undergone a remarkable reversal of fortune, a near-textbook example as to
how an effective strategy can overcome what appear to be overwhelming
drawbacks.
Anbar is close to being secured, thanks to the long-ridiculed strategy of
recruiting local sheiks. A capsule history of war coverage could be put
together from stories on this topic alone - beginning with sneers, moving on
to "evidence" that it would never work, to the puzzled pieces of the past
few months admitting that something was happening, and finally the recent
stories expressing concern that the central government might be "offended"
by the attention being paid former Sunni rebels. (Try to find another story
in the legacy media worrying about the feelings of the Iraqi government.)
What you will not find is any mention of the easily-grasped fact that Anbar
acts as a blueprint for the rest of the country. If the process works there,
it will work elsewhere. If it works in other areas, that means the
destruction of the Jihadis in detail.
Nor is that all. Diyala province, promoted in media as the "new Al-Queda
stronghold" appears to have become a death-trap. The Jihadis can neither
defend it nor abandon it. The Coalition understood that Diyala was where the
Jihadis would flee when the heat came down in Baghdad, and they were ready
for them. A major element of surge strategy - and one reason why the extra
infantry brigades were needed - is to pressure Jihadis constantly in all
their sanctuaries, allowing them no time to rest or regroup.
A blizzard of operations is occurring throughout central Iraq under the
overall code-name Phantom Thunder, the largest operation since the original
invasion. It is open-ended, and will continue as long as necessary. Current
ancillary operations include Arrowhead Ripper, which is securing the city of
Baqubah in Diyala province. Operation Alljah is methodically clearing out
every last neighborhood in Fallujah. In Babil province, southeast of
Baghdad, operations Marne Torch and Commando Eagle are underway. (As this
was being written, yet another spinoff operation, Marne Avalanche, began in
Northern Babil.)
The Coalition has left the treadmill in which one step of progress seemed to
unavoidably lead to two steps back. It requires some time to discover the
proper strategy in any war. A cursory glance at 1943 would have given the
impression of disaster. Kasserine, in which the German Wehrmacht nearly
split Allied forces in Tunisia and sent American GIs running. Tarawa, where
over 1,600 U.S. Marines died on a sunny afternoon thanks to U.S. Navy
overconfidence. Salerno, where the Allied landing force was very nearly
pushed back into the sea. But all these incidents, as bitter as they may
have been, were necessary to develop the proper techniques that led to the
triumphs of 1944 and 1945.
Someday, 2006 may be seen as Iraq's 1943. It appears that Gen. David
Petreaus has discovered the correct strategy for Iraq: engaging the Jihadis
all over the map as close to simultaneously as possible. Keeping them on the
run constantly, giving them no place to stand, rest or refit. Increasing
operational tempo to an extent that they cannot match ("Getting inside their
decision cycle", as the 4th generation warfare school would call it),
leaving them harried, uncertain, and apt to make mistakes.
The surge is more of a refinement than a novelty. Earlier Coalition efforts
were not in error as much as they were incomplete. American troops would
clean out an area, turn it over to an Iraqi unit, and depart. The Jihadis
would then push out the unseasoned Iraqis and return to business. This
occurred in Fallujah, Tall Afar, and endless times in Ramadi.
Now U.S. troops are remaining on site, which reassures the locals and
encourages cooperation. The Jihadis broke (and more than likely never knew)
the cardinal rule of insurgency warfare, that of being a good guest. As Mao
put it, "The revolutionary must be as a fish among the water of the
peasantry." The Jihadis have been lampreys to the Iraqi people.
Proselytizing, forcing adaptation of their reactionary creed, engaging in
torture, kidnapping, and looting. Arabic culture is one in which open
dealings, personal loyalty, and honor are at a premium. Violate any of them,
and there is no way back. The Jihadis violated them all. The towns and
cities of Iraq are no longer sanctuaries.
The results have begun to come in. On July 4, Khaled al-Mashhadani, the most
senior Iraqi in Al-Queda, was captured in Mosul. On July 14, Abu Jurah, a
senior Al-Queda leader in the area south of Baghdad, was killed in a
coordinated strike by artillery, helicopters, and fighter-bombers. These
blows to the leadership are the direct outgrowth of Jihadi brutality and the
new confidence among the Iraqis in what they have begun to call the
"al-Ameriki tribe".
We will see more of this in the weeks ahead. The Jihadis have come up with
no effective counterstrategy, and the old methods have begun to lose mana.
The last massive truck-bomb attack occurred not in Baghdad, but in a small
Diyala village that defied Al-Queda. An insurgency in the position of using
its major weapons to punish noncombatants is not in a winning situation.
You will look long and hard to find any of this in the legacy media. Apart
from a handful of exceptions (such as John F. Burns of the New York Times),
it's simply not being covered. Those operational names would come across as
bizarre to the average reader, the gains they have made impossible to fit
into the worldview that has been peddled unceasingly by the dead tree
fraternity. What the media is concentrating on - and will to continue to
concentrate on, in defiance of sense, protest, and logic, to the bitter
end - is peripheral stories such as the Democrat's Senate pajama party,
reassertions of the claim that the war has "helped" Al-Queda, and the latest
proclamation from the world's greatest fence-sitter.
The situation as it stands is very close to that of the final phase of
Vietnam. Having for several years confused that country's triple-layer
jungle with the rolling plains of northwest Europe, William Westmoreland in
1968 turned over command to Creighton Abrams. Though also a veteran of the
advance against Germany (he had been Patton's favorite armored commander),
Abrams lacked his predecessor's taste for vast (not to mention futile)
multi-unit sweeps. After carrying out a careful analysis, Abrams reworked
Allied strategy to embody the counterinsurgency program advocated by Marine
general Victor Krulak and civilian advisor John Paul Vann.
Abram's war was one of small units moving deep into enemy territory, running
down enemy forces and then calling in massive American firepower in the form
of artillery or fighter-bombers for the final kill.(Anyone wishing for a
detailed portrayal of this style of operations should pick up David
Hackworth's Steel My Soldiers' Hearts. It will surprise no one to learn that
Hackworth claims that the strategy was his idea and that he had to fight the
entire U.S. military establishment to see it through, but it's a good read
all the same.) This was a strategy that played to American strengths, one
that went after the enemy where he lived. By 1970, Abrams had chased the
bulk of the Vietnamese communists across the border into Cambodia and Laos.
But Vietnam also had its ruling narrative, one that had no room for
successful combat operations. That narrative had been born in 1968, at the
time of the Tet offensive. Tet was a nationwide operation intended by North
Vietnamese commander Nguyen Vo Giap to encourage the Vietnamese people to
join with the Viet Cong and PAVN in overthrowing the government. It was an
utter rout, with the communists losing something in the order of 60,000 men.
The Viet Cong were crippled as a military force, and never did recover.
But panicky reporters, many of whom had never set foot on a battlefield (not
to mention figures at ease with manipulating the facts, such as Peter
Arnett), were badly shaken by the opening moves of the offensive, among them
an abortive attack on the U.S. embassy grounds at Saigon. Their reportage,
broadcast and printed nationwide, portrayed a miserable defeat for the U.S.
and its allies, with the Viet Cong and PAVN striking where they pleased and
making off at their leisure. The media portrait of a beleaguered American
war effort was never corrected, and became the consensus view. (This process
was analyzed in detail in Peter Braestrup's Big Story, one of the most
crucial -- and overlooked -- media studies ever to see print.) After Tet,
there could be no victories.
The success of the Abrams strategy was buried for twenty years and more, as
the myth of utter U.S. defeat was put in concrete by "experts" such as
Stanley Karnow, Frances FitzGerald, and Neil Sheehan. Only with the
appearance of revisionist works such as Lewis Sorley's A Better War and Mark
Moyar's Triumph Forsaken has the record begun to be set straight.
That was how it was played at the close of the Vietnam War. That's how it's
being played today.
And what do they want, exactly? What is the purpose of playing so fast and
loose with the public safety, national security, and human lives both
American and foreign?
Generally, when someone repeats a formula, it's because they want to repeat
a result. And that's what the American left wants in this case. During the
mid-70s, American liberals held political control to an extent they had not
experienced since the heyday of FDR. The GOP was disgraced and demoralized.
The Democrats held the Senate, the House, and the presidency. There was
absolutely nothing standing in the way of their maintaining complete power
for as long as anyone could foresee... until Jimmy Carter's incompetence
proved itself, which caused the whole shabby and illusory structure to fell
apart in a welter of ineptitude and childishness.
The American left wants a return to the 1970s -- without Jimmy Carter.
(Okay, without disco, either.) They want a cowed GOP. They want control of
the institutions and the branches. They want a miserable, defeated country
they can manipulate. And they want it all under the gaze not of the Saint of
Plains, but of Hillary Rodham Clinton, who can assure that left-wing
predominance will continue for a generation or more.
Will they get it? That's a question worth some thought. Because as it
stands, neither of the program's necessary elements is coming to fruition.
The war is not being lost, and their great political scandal has fizzled.
The other half of the equation was Watergate. Vietnam would not have been
anywhere near as much a disaster without it. Watergate paralyzed the Nixon
administration. It turned Nixon himself from an odd, unlikable, but
incredibly capable politician to a half-crazed ghost sobbing in the Oval
office in the middle of the night. It transformed his last great triumph --
the Paris peace accords that ended the war on an acceptable standoff -- into
ashes. The left wing of the Democratic Party, shepherded by people like
George McGovern and Mark Hatfield, proceeded to undercut the settlement as
quickly as they could manage. Two separate appropriations acts passed in
June 1973 cut off all further aid to the countries of Southeast Asia. (A
third such act passed in August 1974 has gained more attention but it only
duplicated the effects of the first two.) From that point on it was a matter
of time. Nixon resigned a little over a year later. Less than a year after
that, in April 1975, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia all fell.
(The price tag for this, which liberals don't care to bring up, was over 2
million dead in Cambodia, 165,000 dead in Vietnam, another 200,000 plus
drowned and murdered on the high seas during the exodus of the boat people.
Laotian numbers can only be estimated but must have been in the thousands.
The price of Indochinese "peace" was nearly twice that of the war itself.)
And that, in case you were wondering, is what Plamegate was about. The
Democrats needed a scandal - and not merely a run-of-the-mill, everyday
scandal, but a mega-scandal, a hyper-scandal, something that would utterly
cripple the administration and leave it open to destruction in detail. The
targets were Karl Rove and Dick Cheney, held by the MoveOn crowd to be the
actual brains behind Adolf W. Chimp. When nothing at all could be dug up on
the administration principals, the scandal was effectively over. Knocking
off a vice-presidential aide might cause excitement within the Beltway, but
nobody in the real world could be expected to care. It may be a bitter
thought to I. Lewis Libby that he was taken down through sheer proximity,
like a bystander during a drive-by shooting, but it was in the very best of
causes. Libby's sacrifice not only saved the administration, it may well
save tens of thousands of Middle Eastern lives in the years to come. (This
also explains why the President was so circumspect in dealing with the
investigation - he knew exactly what the opposition was up to, and could
afford to give them no ammunition whatsoever.)
Plamegate ended last Thursday with a judge throwing Plame's suit out of
court on strictly technical grounds. (This is something of a
disappointment - I would really have liked to see what that pair of hustlers
would do when cross-examined by a competent defense attorney.) People like
John Conyers are trying to create a conflagration by blowing on the embers
of the attorney firings and the vice-presidential subpoenas. To no avail.
Scandals, like forest fires, occur only when conditions are perfect. Through
their failed efforts, the liberals have in effect set a backfire,
surrounding the administration with wide barriers of burned-over ground. The
Democrats themselves have rendered Bush unassailable, and all the slumber
parties, the empty votes, and the rhetoric are intended to camouflage that
fact. Bush will have hard days yet, but he will not be Nixonized. He will
be able to fight his war as he sees fit.
That means a continuation of the surge, and of the strategy of General
Petreaus. Will that be enough? It's impossible to say. But the past few
months have been the most surprising in the entire Iraq saga to date. I have
a feeling that Al-Queda (and the media, and the Democrats), will have a few
more surprises coming in the months ahead.
On Jul 25, 9:04 am, "Mitch__A" <[email hidden]> wrote:
> It's now quite clear how the results of the surge will be dealt with by
> domestic opponents of the Iraq war.
>
<Snip a load of shit>
If you want the war so badly, why don't YOU go over there yourself,
soldier? I think the true
reason we are over there is because Bu$h had a vendetta against Saddam
for (allegedly) trying
to kill his father (Bu$h Sr.) back in. The Oil is a very nice bonus.
http://www.google.com/search?&q=%22tried+to+kill+bush%22+saddam
On Jul 25, 9:04 am, "Mitch__A" <[email hidden]> wrote:
zeez
View profile
More options Jul 25, 12:06 pm
Newsgroups: rec.autos.simulators
From: zeez <[email hidden]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2007 12:06:12 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 25 2007 12:06 pm
Subject: Re: America's enemy... The Democrat
Reply | Reply to author | Forward | Print | Individual message | Show
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On Jul 25, 9:04 am, "Mitch__A" <[email hidden]> wrote:
> It's now quite clear how the results of the surge will be dealt with by
> domestic opponents of the Iraq war.
<Snip a load of shit>
If you want the war so badly, why don't YOU go over there yourself,
soldier? I think the true reason we are over there is because Bu$h had
a vendetta against Saddam for (allegedly) trying to kill his father (Bu
$h Sr.) back in the 1990's. The oil is a very nice bonus.
http://www.google.com/search?&q=%22tried+to+kill+bush%22+saddam
Quoted text (133 lines)
> It's now quite clear how the results of the surge will be dealt with by > domestic opponents of the Iraq war. > > They're going to be ignored. > > They're being ignored now. Virtually no media source or Democratic > politician (and not a few Republicans, led by Richard "I can always > backtrack" Lugar) is willing to admit that the situation on the ground has > changed dramatically over the past three months. Coalition efforts have > undergone a remarkable reversal of fortune, a near-textbook example as to > how an effective strategy can overcome what appear to be overwhelming > drawbacks. > > Anbar is close to being secured, thanks to the long-ridiculed strategy of > recruiting local sheiks. A capsule history of war coverage could be put > together from stories on this topic alone - beginning with sneers, moving on > to "evidence" that it would never work, to the puzzled pieces of the past > few months admitting that something was happening, and finally the recent > stories expressing concern that the central government might be "offended" > by the attention being paid former Sunni rebels. (Try to find another story > in the legacy media worrying about the feelings of the Iraqi government.) > What you will not find is any mention of the easily-grasped fact that Anbar > acts as a blueprint for the rest of the country. If the process works there, > it will work elsewhere. If it works in other areas, that means the > destruction of the Jihadis in detail. > > Nor is that all. Diyala province, promoted in media as the "new Al-Queda > stronghold" appears to have become a death-trap. The Jihadis can neither > defend it nor abandon it. The Coalition understood that Diyala was where the > Jihadis would flee when the heat came down in Baghdad, and they were ready > for them. A major element of surge strategy - and one reason why the extra > infantry brigades were needed - is to pressure Jihadis constantly in all > their sanctuaries, allowing them no time to rest or regroup. > > A blizzard of operations is occurring throughout central Iraq under the > overall code-name Phantom Thunder, the largest operation since the original > invasion. It is open-ended, and will continue as long as necessary. Current > ancillary operations include Arrowhead Ripper, which is securing the city of > Baqubah in Diyala province. Operation Alljah is methodically clearing out > every last neighborhood in Fallujah. In Babil province, southeast of > Baghdad, operations Marne Torch and Commando Eagle are underway. (As this > was being written, yet another spinoff operation, Marne Avalanche, began in > Northern Babil.) > > The Coalition has left the treadmill in which one step of progress seemed to > unavoidably lead to two steps back. It requires some time to discover the > proper strategy in any war. A cursory glance at 1943 would have given the > impression of disaster. Kasserine, in which the German Wehrmacht nearly > split Allied forces in Tunisia and sent American GIs running. Tarawa, where > over 1,600 U.S. Marines died on a sunny afternoon thanks to U.S. Navy > overconfidence. Salerno, where the Allied landing force was very nearly > pushed back into the sea. But all these incidents, as bitter as they may > have been, were necessary to develop the proper techniques that led to the > triumphs of 1944 and 1945. > > Someday, 2006 may be seen as Iraq's 1943. It appears that Gen. David > Petreaus has discovered the correct strategy for Iraq: engaging the Jihadis > all over the map as close to simultaneously as possible. Keeping them on the > run constantly, giving them no place to stand, rest or refit. Increasing > operational tempo to an extent that they cannot match ("Getting inside their > decision cycle", as the 4th generation warfare school would call it), > leaving them harried, uncertain, and apt to make mistakes. > > The surge is more of a refinement than a novelty. Earlier Coalition efforts > were not in error as much as they were incomplete. American troops would > clean out an area, turn it over to an Iraqi unit, and depart. The Jihadis > would then push out the unseasoned Iraqis and return to business. This > occurred in Fallujah, Tall Afar, and endless times in Ramadi. > > Now U.S. troops are remaining on site, which reassures the locals and > encourages cooperation. The Jihadis broke (and more than likely never knew) > the cardinal rule of insurgency warfare, that of being a good guest. As Mao > put it, "The revolutionary must be as a fish among the water of the > peasantry." The Jihadis have been lampreys to the Iraqi people. > Proselytizing, forcing adaptation of their reactionary creed, engaging in > torture, kidnapping, and looting. Arabic culture is one in which open > dealings, personal loyalty, and honor are at a premium. Violate any of them, > and there is no way back. The Jihadis violated them all. The towns and > cities of Iraq are no longer sanctuaries. > > The results have begun to come in. On July 4, Khaled al-Mashhadani, the most > senior Iraqi in Al-Queda, was captured in Mosul. On July 14, Abu Jurah, a > senior Al-Queda leader in the area south of Baghdad, was killed in a > coordinated strike by artillery, helicopters, and fighter-bombers. These > blows to the leadership are the direct outgrowth of Jihadi brutality and the > new confidence among the Iraqis in what they have begun to call the > "al-Ameriki tribe". > > We will see more of this in the weeks ahead. The Jihadis have come up with > no effective counterstrategy, and the old methods have begun to lose mana. > The last massive truck-bomb attack occurred not in Baghdad, but in a small > Diyala village that defied Al-Queda. An insurgency in the position of using > its major weapons to punish noncombatants is not in a winning situation. > > You will look long and hard to find any of this in the legacy media. Apart > from a handful of exceptions (such as John F. Burns of the New York Times), > it's simply not being covered. Those operational names would come across as > bizarre to the average reader, the gains they have made impossible to fit > into the worldview that has been peddled unceasingly by the dead tree > fraternity. What the media is concentrating on - and will to continue to > concentrate on, in defiance of sense, protest, and logic, to the bitter > end - is peripheral stories such as the Democrat's Senate pajama party, > reassertions of the claim that the war has "helped" Al-Queda, and the latest > proclamation from the world's greatest fence-sitter. > > The situation as it stands is very close to that of the final phase of > Vietnam. Having for several years confused that country's triple-layer > jungle with the rolling plains of northwest Europe, William Westmoreland in > 1968 turned over command to Creighton Abrams. Though also a veteran of the > advance against Germany (he had been Patton's favorite armored commander), > Abrams lacked his predecessor's taste for vast (not to mention futile) > multi-unit sweeps. After carrying out a careful analysis, Abrams reworked > Allied strategy to embody the counterinsurgency program advocated by Marine > general Victor Krulak and civilian advisor John Paul Vann. > > Abram's war was one of small units moving deep into enemy territory, running > down enemy forces and then calling in massive American firepower in the form > of artillery or fighter-bombers for the final kill.(Anyone wishing for a > detailed portrayal of this style of operations should pick up David > Hackworth's Steel My Soldiers' Hearts. It will surprise no one to learn that > Hackworth claims that the strategy was his idea and that he had to fight the > entire U.S. military establishment to see it through, but it's a good read > all the same.) This was a strategy that played to American strengths, one > that went after the enemy where he lived. By 1970, Abrams had chased the > bulk of the Vietnamese communists across the border into Cambodia and Laos. > > But Vietnam also had its ruling narrative, one that had no room for > successful combat operations. That narrative had been born in 1968, at the > time of the Tet offensive. Tet was a nationwide operation intended by North > Vietnamese commander Nguyen Vo Giap to encourage the Vietnamese people to > join with the Viet Cong and PAVN in overthrowing the government. It was an > utter rout, with the communists losing something in the order of 60,000 men. > The Viet Cong were crippled as a military force, and never did recover.zeez wrote:
> On Jul 25, 9:04 am, "Mitch__A" <[email hidden]> wrote:
> <Snip a load of shit>
>
> If you want the war so badly, why don't YOU go over there yourself,
> soldier?
He won't replay - he's too cowardly to speak for himself.
It's all he can manage to cut+paste the 'brave' talk of others.
-Moo!
Slightly off topic, but let's get to the point.......
Contrary to popular belief, Americans are not 'war mongers.' That said, we're not going to sit on our hands and get our ass handed to us while doing nothing as some European nations have already. We are willing to take the battle to the enemy rather than letting it come to us - no matter who that enemy may be.
The Arab world has the West thinking that our foreign policies are the root cause of terror. That same propaganda is being spread here to. The fact is, it has very little to do with foreign policy, and virtually everything to do with the goal of slowly weakening Western society/governments and reclaiming 7th century lands that were once a part of the Muslim dynasty. That cannot be done without taking America down as they intend to reclaim Europe.
If you are asking yourself, what the hell is he talking about, it is time you did some research and read up on Islamo-fascism from those who used to be a part of terrorist organizations. Several former terrorists say just what I have stated above and past history is a pretty good indicator of what the goal is. Al Qaeda members must be laughing every time our media outlets spew their propaganda for them, because they know that the longer the truth is masked, the better chance they have of succeeding in taking down the Western world.
As unpopular as this war is, and the fact that our intelligence services (and several European ones as well) failed to realize that Saddam got rid of the weapons, it would be smart to realize that the war in Iraq changed after Saddam was caught. Even though the original purpose was to take away the threat that Saddam posed with weapons of mass destruction, that purpose has changed based upon events on the ground. It is now a fight to kill as many terrorists as possible and to train Iraqis to do the same and eliminate the terror attacks occurring daily on their streets.
Whether Americans support it or not, the war has served to keep the enemy occupied over there instead of carrying out another 9/11 over here.
.....before I get any smartass replies with 'why don't you go over there and fight yourself' - the answer is I HAVE ALREADY DONE SO, and would do so again if my country called on me to do so.
Wag
"Greg Campbell" <[email hidden]> wrote in message news:r%cqi.305$[email hidden]...
zeez wrote:
> On Jul 25, 9:04 am, "Mitch__A" <[email hidden]> wrote:
> <Snip a load of shit>
>
> If you want the war so badly, why don't YOU go over there yourself,
> soldier?
He won't replay - he's too cowardly to speak for himself.
It's all he can manage to cut+paste the 'brave' talk of others.
-Moo!
Again, please refrain from full-quoting this drivel, it only adds to the
noise (just like this reply, I'm sure ;-)
Thanks, uwe
--
GPG Fingerprint: 2E 13 20 22 9A 3F 63 7F 67 6F E9 B1 A8 36 A4 61
> snip miles of typical dribble
Mitch, the heading is almost correct. It should read - America's Enemy -
Democracy!
There - another one of the planets fuck ups fixed! :)


































